The Stanford Business Reporter

Kenneth Lieberthal is at the University of Michigan where he is a Professor of Political Science and the William Davidson Professor of Business Administration.  He served in the Clinton Administration for 1998-2000 as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council.  He is also the father of Geoff Lieberthal, MBA2.

America’s war on terrorism has profoundly changed our global strategic opportunities.  While the media have naturally focused on Afghanistan where the action is, the most important longer-term story lies elsewhere.  America has in the past four months enhanced its power on the world stage, but new approaches are required to capitalize on the new opportunities.

America now enjoys a new strategic position for two reasons.  First, because other countries clearly recognized the inherent justness of America’s rage and ensuing campaign, existing anti-Americanism softened and governments everywhere declared support for the United States’ war on Al-Qaeda.  The President’s insistence that the US will reward its friends and punish its enemies and that nobody can straddle the fence crystallized the incentives for everyone, and the administration’s actions since September have been good to the president’s words.

Second, despite campaign rhetoric in 2000 that the Clinton administration had “hollowed out” the US military, the US war in Afghanistan has highlighted the opposite: during the 1990s America’s military achieved enormous gains in capabilities. The last four months have showcased an unprecedented level of integration of remote sensing, smart weapons, and advanced communications.  All other powers now must factor this increased American military superiority into their strategic calculations.  Even those like the Chinese who have worked hard to begin to close the military technology gap with the US since Desert Storm have instead seen that gap widen. 

This combination of American moral certitude, policy clarity, and military prowess has, at least for the short term, measurably strengthened the United States’ international position.  There is palpably less international willingness to either ignore or contradict us.  The task now is to change this short-term achievement into a significant long-term strategic realignment that is very much in America’s interests. 

We now have an unprecedented opportunity to forge strong diplomatic and security ties simultaneously with the NATO countries, Russia, Pakistan, India, and a more activist Japan, even while maintaining manageable stability with China.  This could give us latitude for new American policies to promote political and economic reforms and greater long-term stability in Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.  Developments beyond America’s control could, of course, trip up our efforts to achieve this full set of strategic gains.  We will need some luck, and  we will also have to play our cards right.

In this, we could become our own greatest obstacle.  In the Afghan war to date, America has been able to focus on military efforts and count on the shock of September 11 to make it easy to put into place the necessary political complement.  But this political bye will erode rapidly in the coming year. As this happens, the choices the Administration makes on four basic issues will largely determine the United States’ success during 2002 both in the ongoing war against terrorism and in reaping broad strategic benefits from the current international flux. In one form or another, these four are actually various sides of the core issue of unilateralism – that is, whether we pursue an approach that does not seriously seek and utilize input from those who are affected by our policies. 

First, will the Administration apply America’s preeminent military power in muscular fashion to shape a world narrowly in America’s interests – or will it now start to nurture more genuine international cooperation?  Even our closest friends and allies oppose our choosing the former option. 

Second, will America continue to rely almost solely on “hard” measures -- military force and economic sanctions -- to bring to account terrorist organizations and those who harbor them?  Or will it also provide economic and other assistance to help change the conditions that have incubated terrorism in the past? 

Third, will the US prove able to mobilize other countries to deny terrorists all forms of sanctuary, pool intelligence and coordinate police work, and revise and seriously enforce relevant banking laws?  In these areas, half measures and feigned compliance are relatively easy options.  Genuine results demand the kind of serious commitment from every government that grows out of a sense of shared partnership and consultation. 

Fourth, will America strengthen or weaken multilateral organizations in the fight against terrorism?  The Administration can make the United Nations usefully engaged or can relegate the UN to a role of either residual cheerleader or irrelevant critic.

 The United States now can successfully wage the war against terrorism as that war enters a more political phase and consolidate a set of diplomatic and military relationships that will provide enhanced security and opportunity for years to come.  To take these giant steps, though, the Bush Administration will have to overcome its instinct for defining America's responsibilities narrowly and our approach unilaterally.  Otherwise, even our friends and allies will temper their cooperation with efforts to limit American domination, and an important historical opportunity will have been missed.   

 

 

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